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Abstract 
This paper examines the use of incentive pay schemes within the financial 
services sector in London. Various theories of wage determination are reviewed 
with particular attention placed on the principal-agent literature as a framework 
for analysing the use of incentive pay. This is combined with case study 
interviews and a number of hypotheses regarding the use of bonuses.  
Quantitative analysis of a detailed industry-wide survey validates the hypothesis 
that those occupations where output is easily identifiable receive higher bonus 
pay. The proximity of an occupation to the revenue generating activity within 
the organisation is also found to be significant in determining bonus levels, as is 
job grade within the organisation. The paper concludes that principal-agent 
theories of wage determination are useful in understanding the use of bonus pay 
in the City, but need to be modified to take account of particular institutional 
characteristics, in particular the power of individual agents. 
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DETERMINANTS OF THE USE OF FINANCIAL INCENTIVES 
IN INVESTMENT BANKING 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
The use of variable pay schemes has recently attracted attention in both 
academic and professional circles. This interest has been heightened by the 
increased use of such schemes across most sectors of the economy. Economic 
theory has long predicted the potential of a payment system to increase the 
productivity of workers. In situations where employers cannot accurately assess 
whether an employee is working sufficiently hard, theory suggests that 
performance related pay schemes are a way that sufficient worker effort may be 
elicited. The question facing both researchers and managers is the extent to 
which these variable pay schemes achieve their aim of increasing labour 
productivity. 
 
The financial services sector is exceptional in its use of bonus pay. The sector is 
characterised by both high levels of remuneration and near universal coverage 
of bonus pay amongst employees. The proliferation of consultancy activity 
directed at remuneration in the City is testament to the importance attached to 
payment systems in that sector. Financial services, and investment banking in 
particular, are characterised by both distinct product markets and occupational 
structures. These characteristics, combined with the ubiquitous nature of bonus 
pay, serve to make the financial services sector well suited to an empirical 
investigation of the determinants of pay. 
 
Despite the strong interest in the economics of pay, there is relatively little 
empirical work on the subject. The majority of the work that exists is 
concentrated on the effectiveness of chief executive pay. These studies tend to 
concentrate on the incentive effects of granting shares or share options to senior 
management. There has been little written about the effectiveness of incentive 
pay for employees lower down the organisational hierarchy. Similarly, despite 
the theory being rich with testable predictions, there are precious few empirical 
studies on the subject of a firm’s choice of payment system. This shortage of 
empirical work is amplified when it comes to the financial services sector. This 
is in part due to the difficulty of obtaining data in such a competitive market, 
where remuneration is treated as highly sensitive. 
 
The main theory used in this research is the principal agent model. The principal 
agent problem is said to exist when there is an information asymmetry between 
principals and agents or, in this case, managers and workers. The theory 
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suggests that in the absence of perfect monitoring, the provision of an incentive 
contract should ensure that the agent puts forth sufficient effort. Such contracts 
will lie along a spectrum between the provision of income insurance on the one 
hand, and the provision of incentives on the other. The model predicts a number 
of variables that will be associated with particular forms of payment system. 
The purpose of this paper is to test how satisfactory principal agent-theory is in 
explaining the observed pay patterns in the financial services sector. In addition 
to looking at principal-agent theory, other factors such as the bargaining power 
of employees will be examined and evaluated in the light of the data. 
 
This paper will draw upon both quantitative data and case study interviews. 
Survey data at the industry level will be used to analyse the use of variable pay 
in financial services. The quantitative data will be used to examine the patterns 
of bonus pay in the financial services sector and form the basis for statistical 
tests designed to evaluate the predictions of theory. The case study interviews 
will be used to outline the characteristics of pay setting in the financial services 
sector and confirm many of the predictions contained in the principal-agent 
literature. 
 
Statistical techniques will be utilised to assess the validity of various theoretical 
hypotheses. The measurability of output, job grade within the organisation, and 
a measure of marginal product will be tested to see how well they are associated 
with variations in both salaries and bonus levels. The results are mixed, but 
broadly supportive of the predictions of principal-agent theory. The paper ends 
with the conclusion that the principal-agent framework is useful in 
understanding the use of bonus pay in the financial services sector, but that it 
needs to be extended to take account of occupationally specific ‘hold-up’ 
problems brought about by coercive employee power in the labour market. 
 
 
II.  The Theory and Evidence of Incentive Provision 
 
It has long been recognised that the market for labour does not behave in the 
same way as those for other commodities. A variety of features combine to 
make the analysis of the exchange of labour services more complex than simply 
the interaction of supply and demand; ‘the variable to be determined is not a 
price but a complicated functional relationship’ (Arrow 1985, p44). Principal-
agent theory is an attempt to better explain this relationship. It, therefore, 
provides a valuable starting point for analysing the choice of payment system. 
 
The employment relationship may be characterised as a principal-agent problem 
in that the principal (employer) pays the agent (employee) to undertake work on 
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his behalf. The principal-agent problem becomes analytically interesting when: 
a) the agent’s action is not directly observable; or b) output is not completely 
determined by the agent’s effort. These can be termed the ‘hidden action’ and 
‘hidden information’ problems respectively (Arrow 1985). In the former, 
worker effort is the hidden action and is also a source of disutility to the worker. 
In the latter case, the agent has information that is not revealed to the principal, 
who cannot thereby check to see that the information is being used in an 
appropriate manner. 
 
There emerges a problem of incentives. The principal must design a contract 
that maximises his expected utility given that the agent will act to maximise his 
own utility arising from the compensation scheme. The principal must, 
therefore, offer sufficient rewards to induce the agent to accept the contract, the 
so called ‘participation constraint’. 
 
The classic case of share cropping between landowners and tenant farmers 
illustrates the basic features of the principal-agent model (Stiglitz 1974). The 
landowner is assumed to be able to costlessly measure the quantity and quality 
of output, whilst the direct monitoring of the farmer’s work effort is taken to be 
prohibitively expensive. The landowner is therefore faced with designing an 
output based reward structure to motivate the farmer to work the land 
efficiently. A simple incentive contract would be for the owner to charge the 
farmer a fixed fee in return for the farmer being able to sell the produce from 
the land. However, since the output of the farm is not wholly attributable to the 
farmer’s effort the incentive scheme outlined will expose the farmer to 
variations in income resulting from random variations in factors outside his 
control, most obviously the weather. 
 
The landowner is assumed to be risk-neutral. As a result he is in a position to 
offer the tenant farmer an insurance contract, whereby the farmer is paid a fixed 
wage and the farm output accrues to the landowner. When the agent is insured 
against bad outcomes his interests are no longer perfectly aligned with those of 
the principal; there is no incentive to exert effort in order to avoid bad outcomes  
(Sappington 1991). The optimal contract will, therefore, be one in which the 
farmer is paid a fee that is less than his alternative wages but he will also 
receive a share of the farm’s output. The size of the fixed-fee component will 
rise with the farmer’s risk aversion and will decrease when greater effort 
incentives are needed (Stiglitz 1974; Nalebuff and Stiglitz 1983). Thus contract 
choice falls on a spectrum with the provision of risk sharing at one extreme and 
the provision of incentives at the other (Stiglitz 1987).  
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The principal-agent problem can be applied to understanding the choice facing 
firms regarding the optimal payment system. Many of the principal-agent 
models, including the sharecropping example outlined above, assume that 
principals have information regarding the agent’s output. The problem arises 
from this output being partly determined by environmental factors. The 
principal is left with the task of obtaining some measure of the agent’s effort in 
an attempt to insure them against fluctuations in income (Brown 1990). An 
adaptation of this model has been proposed, whereby a firm does not know the 
level of worker output unless some form of output monitoring is undertaken 
(Lazear 1986). 
 
In his paper Lazear examines: ‘the choice between a fixed salary for some 
period of time, that is, paying on the basis of input and paying a piece 
compensation that is specifically geared to output’ (Lazear 1986, pp.405-6). 
Fruit picking is illustrative of the extreme case of a pure piece-rate system 
where an amount of payment per unit of fruit harvested is specified in advance. 
Lazear argues, however, that many other occupations exhibit characteristics that 
can be effectively treated in the same way. The distinction drawn is that 
between a system where there is a ‘synchronisation between output and 
compensation’ on the one hand, and salaries on the other, which implies that a 
worker’s pay is independent of output (Lazear 1986, p407). 
 
Much of the existing literature on principal-agent theory seeks to evaluate the 
effectiveness of incentive pay as a motivating device. The purpose of this paper 
is not to add to that body of work, but rather to explain the choice of payment 
system facing firms in the financial services sector. One study that seeks to do 
something similar is Brown (1990). He proposes a choice of three pay schemes; 
piece-rates, merit pay and standard time rates all associated with different 
monitoring costs. A list of factors that are significant in determining a firm’s 
choice of payment system emerges, which include establishment size, 
occupational concentration within a firm, the diversification of duties within a 
particular occupation, and the degree of teamwork required in the production 
process (Brown 1990) 
 
The fundamental prediction underlying the above analysis is that the use of 
variable pay schemes is inversely related to the costs of monitoring worker 
effort. This leads to the prediction that bonus pay will be more prevalent in 
occupations where performance is readily measurable. This paper will assess 
the extent to which this is true in the context of the UK financial services sector.  
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III.  Methodology and Data 
 
Gaining research access to financial institutions is difficult. The dearth of 
empirical data on this sector of the economy is testament to this fact. The 
sensitivity of remuneration data in a highly competitive sector was the reason 
usually cited by institutions in declining to participate in the research. Despite 
the considerable problems in gaining access, a cross sectional sample of six case 
studies was established. Factors such as firm size, nationality of ownership and 
occupational dispersion within a firm influenced the choice of case study 
institutions.  The final sample contained British, continental European and 
Japanese institutions.  The size of the firms ranged from the very small to the 
large and there was a mix of specialised organisations and those that provided a 
full range of banking services.  
 
The interviews were designed to gain information about both the process of pay 
setting and the factors that were important in determining the structure of 
remuneration. Five of the six interviews were conducted with either personnel 
managers or senior managers in the institution. All of the interviewees had a 
detailed knowledge of remuneration management across the whole of their 
institutions. The interviews were semi-structured in nature. This was to allow 
comparability across the sample but also to encourage as wide a discussion of 
pay policy as possible.  Therefore, the case studies were not primarily used as a 
source of quantitative data, but rather as a means of understanding the 
institutional context of pay setting in the financial services sector.  
 
Quantitative data on pay in the financial services sector is difficult to obtain due 
to the institutions’ concerns over confidentiality. However, an invaluable, yet 
untapped, source of quantitative data comes in the form of third party 
consultant’s pay surveys. One of the best established of such surveys is the 
International Banks and Investment Houses, Remuneration Guide published by 
the Monks Partnership (Monks Partnership 1997). This survey series has been 
conducted since 1990 and is published quarterly. The data contained in the 
survey provide a good picture of pay practice in the city due to the fact that it 
gathers data from over 150 institutions. The validity of the data is enhanced 
further by the fact that they form the basis of pay setting in the sector itself. The 
fieldwork interviews revealed that consultant’s surveys, including the one 
published by the Monks Partnership, were an important tool in determining the 
market level for both salaries and bonuses. The data can, therefore, be viewed as 
an authoritative source of information on pay practices in financial services. 
 
The survey used for the detailed analysis in this paper is that which was 
published in August 1997. The dataset contains information that was collected 
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from 171 institutions and contains data for both base salary and bonuses.  The 
data are presented in the form of occupational summaries; for 349 separate job 
titles there are data on mean base salary and mean bonus (expressed as a 
percentage of base salary). These figures represent the average bonus and salary 
levels across all firms that have employees in that occupation.  The main 
drawback of the dataset is the absence of information regarding firm size.  This 
is unfortunate since one of the stronger predictions of theory is that the use of 
variable pay schemes will be positively associated with the size of the firm.  
However, there is no evidence that there is any selection bias in the Monks 
Partnership sample with regard to firm size.  Therefore, it provides a solid basis 
to test the predictions of principal-agent theory with respect to the use of bonus 
pay in the financial services industry. 
 
 
IV. The Institutional Characteristics of Pay Setting in the Financial 
Services Sector 
 
The qualitative interviews confirmed that there is a complex matrix of factors 
that influence the amount of bonus an individual receives and the process by 
which it is arrived at. A senior remuneration consultant who had experience of 
designing pay systems in the financial services sector suggested four 
fundamental variables: the degree of individual power, the economic value that 
is being created, the complexity of that value and finally, the degree of 
teamwork required. These insights correspond strongly with the predictions of 
theory and will be examined in further detail. 
 
The degree of individual power refers essentially to the bargaining power of the 
individual with respect to the firm. This power derives from the fundamental 
problem of economic scarcity. One bank that was interviewed explained that 
their strategy for allocating the bonus pool was to protect the ‘crown jewels’ 
and prevent them from leaving the organisation.   According to more than one 
interviewee, banks often pay above the market clearing level in order to retain 
the services of the individual and the associated revenue stream. This was not an 
isolated comment and many institutions spoke of the difficulty in reconciling 
the wage demands of high achievers with the desire to retain some kind of 
internal consistency in remuneration levels. 
 
This phenomenon is consistent with Williamson’s analysis of ‘hold-up’ in the 
employment relationship (Williamson 1985). Where the individual has firm 
specific human capital then both parties will have an interest in the employment 
relationship continuing, and the employee may be able to appropriate higher 
wages from the employer in return for not quitting. In the case of financial 
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services this mechanism may be skewed even further in favour of employees. If 
the human capital of the employee is not fully firm specific but highly desirable 
by competitor firms, then the hold-up problem is heightened. This is likely to be 
the case in the City due to the shortage of specialised labour in the sector. Due 
to the lack of firm specific human capital the employee can quit with little cost 
to himself whereas the firm has a strong incentive to retain the services of the 
employee. This provides a strong theoretical basis for the high bonus levels that 
are observed in the City. 
 
That remuneration is linked to the economic value being created is consistent 
with economic theory. The marginal revenue product theory of wages predicts 
that since the value created by some individuals in the city is exceptionally high 
wages should follow suit. The notion of marginal productivity is intrinsically 
difficult to quantify. During the course of the interviews, however, it became 
apparent that managers have a conception of a worker’s marginal product, 
which is expressed in terms such as ‘economic value’ and ‘revenue generation’. 
There is an accepted classification system of ‘front’, ‘middle’ and ‘back’ office 
functions that implicitly refers to the marginal revenue product of the 
employees within them. The significance of this recognition of the importance 
of marginal revenue product in pay setting should not be underestimated and 
will be the subject of further analysis. The level of value created will not just be 
a function of individual effort however, and is likely to be related to occupation, 
job grade and prevailing market conditions. 
 
The complexity of the value refers to issues such as whether it is discrete in the 
sense of being fully under the influence of the agent or alternatively contingent 
on factors outside the individual’s control and the time frame over which the 
value is created. Principal-agent theory predicts that incentive contracts will be 
more successful where the costs of monitoring output are lower. The 
determinants of complexity will again vary according to the business 
environment in which the individual is working. 
 
The degree of teamwork called for is important in determining the basis for 
reward. The interviews revealed a universal recognition that if you offer 
incentives based purely on individual financial targets then you will encourage 
individualistic behaviour, or as one interviewee put it people with ‘sharp 
elbows’. Therefore, in occupations where there is a requirement for people to 
work in teams, the design of bonus schemes will reflect this. Again, this 
supports the predictions of theory (Brown 1990). 
 
There are strong interactions between these four factors. The power of the 
individual with respect to the institution will be positively related to the 
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economic value they create and negatively related to the complexity of that 
value and the degree of teamwork required creating it. Despite the difficulty in 
disentangling the individual factors at work from each other, this framework 
provides a useful basis for analysing the process of individual bonus 
determination. Furthermore, it can be used to yield predictions about the 
patterns of pay that are observed in the financial services sector. 
 
A factor which has not been mentioned thus far but which is central to the 
process of bonus determination is that of observability. The theoretical 
importance of this relationship has already been noted. It’s importance was 
confirmed by the interviews, with one interviewee conceding that “to some 
extent [the salary-bonus relationship] depends on the ability to measure 
someone’s contribution; with trading it’s a lot easier since you can see the 
trade someone’s done and whether they’ve made a profit or loss.” 
 
 
V.  An Empirical Evaluation of the Use of Bonus Pay 
 
Univariate Analysis of variance (ANOVA) techniques will be used to assess the 
validity of the hypotheses regarding the determinants of base salary and bonus 
levels. ANOVA analysis is appropriate for situations where the dependent 
variable is continuous and the independent variable is ordinal. The ANOVA 
technique tests whether the difference in means between the categories of the 
dependent variable are statistically significant. An R square value is also 
returned giving an indication of the goodness-of-fit of the model. An important 
assumption of parametric tests of this type is that the data is normally 
distributed. As is common with most income data, the survey data was 
positively skewed. In order to correct this the salary data was transformed by 
taking natural logs (Tabachnick and Fiddel 1996). In this way it will be possible 
to use the more powerful parametric techniques such as ANOVA tests. 
 
 
The Observability of Output 
 
A central prediction of the principal-agent literature is that performance-related 
pay systems will be more prevalent in activities where the output is more easily 
quantified. The fieldwork interviews also identified the extent to which an 
individual’s output is measurable as an important determinant of bonus levels. 
There was a universally held view that bonuses will account for a greater 
proportion of overall pay in those occupations where output can be most easily 
quantified. This prediction can be formally expressed as the following 
hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 1 
The level of bonus received is positively associated with the 
measurability of an individual’s output 
 
In order to test this hypothesis statistically, the measurability of the 349 jobs in 
the survey had to be assessed and expressed on a numerical scale. Descriptive 
information contained in the dataset combined with insights gained from the 
qualitative interviews formed the basis for the creation of a categorical variable 
to describe the measurability of output. 
 
 
Table 1. The Classification of the Measurability of Individual Output 
 
Category Characteristics of Individual Output 
  
Easily Measurable Immediately quantifiable (e.g. the margin made on trading a 
financial asset) 
Identifiable in the short term 
Individually determined 
Somewhat Measurable Quantifiable only in the medium to long term 
May accrue as a result of teamwork 
May be increasingly subject to factors outside the agent’s 
control 
Not Easily Measurable Little/no identifiable output to measure 
 
 
Table 1 illustrates the classification system used to quantify the measurability of 
output in the survey data. Whilst the number of categories is small at only three, 
this enables the hypothesis to be tested whilst reducing the problem of 
arbitrariness in the assignment of occupations to particular categories. Examples 
of occupations with high observability are trading functions where the 
profitability of any transaction is quickly identifiable. Those occupations in the 
middle category include other banking services such as corporate finance and 
other fee-earning activities where output may accrue over a longer time period 
and be subject to factors outside the agent’s control. The last category for 
occupations with little or no observable output will include most support 
services and banking services such as marketing and client administration where 
there is no objectively measurable output. By classifying the entire dataset into 
this three point ordinal scale it will be possible to statistically test the prediction 
of principal-agent theory encapsulated in hypothesis 1. 
 
The discussion thus far has concentrated on the link between measurability and 
bonus levels. The theoretical basis for this link has already been outlined. There 
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is no expectation that measurability of output should be related to base salary in 
the same way. The determination of salary levels is likely to be caused by a 
variety of factors, some of which will be highlighted later in this paper. 
 
The data in Table 2 indicate that both salary and bonus levels are statistically 
associated with the measurability of output. As measurability increases so too 
does mean salary, from just under £28,000 for occupations where output is not 
easily measurable to over £68,500 where it is highly measurable. The relatively 
low R square value indicates that the differences in the measurability of output 
only accounts for 39% of the variation in mean salaries. Thus, although there is 
an association where theory might not predict one, it is moderately weak. 
 
 
Table 2.  Mean Salary and Bonus by Measurability of Output 
 
Measurability of Output Mean Salary £sa Mean Bonus (% of Salary)a 
   
Not Easily Measurable 27,742* 9.6* 
Somewhat Measurable 51,728* 20.2* 
Easily Measurable 68,596* 28.8* 
Total 37,773 13.8 
R Square .390 .410 
a These figures were calculated by anti-logging the values for ln (salary) and ln (bonus) that 
were used in the ANOVA 
* The mean difference between this figure and all others is significant at the 5% level. 
 
 
The results also confirm the hypothesis that measurability and bonus are 
positively associated. The difference in mean bonus between the three 
categories of measurability is significant at the 5% level. The data show that in 
occupations where measurability is high, the level of bonus pay will be 
approximately three times higher then in those positions where there is little or 
no observability of output. The level of the R square indicates that just over 
40% of the variation in bonus levels is attributable to differences in 
measurability. Whilst this figure is relatively low, it is higher than the 
corresponding figure for salary levels. The implication is that the measurability 
of output is a marginally better predictor of bonus levels than it is of salaries. 
This corresponds to the prediction of principal-agent theory. 
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The Economic Value Created 
 
Principal-agent theory is only a partial theory of wage determination. The most 
comprehensive theory in neoclassical economics is that concerning the marginal 
revenue product of labour (MRPL). The MRPL is defined as the extra revenue 
obtained by selling the output an extra worker produces. According to the 
theory, in a perfectly competitive market, the wage is set equal to the MRPL. 
Thus, in part, an individual’s remuneration is determined by the value of the 
output being created.  
 
This assertion was mirrored in the interviews, where there was a recognition of 
the importance of marginal revenue product. Interviewees spoke in terms of the 
‘economic value’ or degree of ‘revenue generation’ being an important 
determinant of pay. Although an imprecise proxy for marginal product, the 
importance of some measure of ‘economic value’ to the process of pay setting is 
clear. Thus, the combination of theoretical insight with case study data can be 
used to generate a hypothesis, which will be empirically tested: 
 
Hypothesis 2 
Wages (salary and bonus) are positively associated with the 
‘economic value’ created by the individual 
 
The interviews confirmed the importance of revenue generation in wage 
determination. Unlike the case of measurability of output, there is no clear-cut 
theoretical reason why this phenomenon should apply to bonus levels more than 
base salaries. The interviews highlighted the fact that certain low-earning 
banking functions receive low bonuses whilst those support functions that are 
specifically identified with revenue earning activities often receive higher 
bonuses, despite a relatively low measurability of output. Thus, the ‘economic 
value’ being created by an individual may be a significant determinant of both 
salary levels and bonuses. 
 
In order to empirically test hypothesis 2, a scale of the economic value created 
by each of the 349 jobs in the survey is required. Within the financial services 
sector there is an accepted classification system for different areas of activity 
within an organisation, namely ‘front’, ‘middle’ and ‘back’ office. The 
classification refers to the extent to which an occupation is involved with the 
process of direct revenue creation. 
 
Front office staff re those involved in revenue generation activities, which 
include dealers, corporate financiers as well as those involved in selling the 
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bank’s services to other institutions or individuals. Analysts and researchers are 
also included in the front office category, despite the fact they do not directly 
earn revenue for the bank. Their inclusion is merited by the fact that, as one 
interviewee put it, ‘they are pivotal in creating house views’ and are an integral 
part of the success of the business. 
 
This classification system provides an ordinal scale for measuring the economic 
value created by an individual jobholder. According to the MRPL theory of 
wage determination, those individuals in the front office should receive higher 
wages than those in the middle and back offices. By classifying each individual 
position within the dataset as a front, middle or back office function, it will be 
possible to statistically test this assertion. In particular, it will be possible to 
examine the relative strength of the theory in terms of its application to bonus 
levels and salaries. 
 
Table 3. Mean Salary and Bonus by Office Activity 
 
Office Activity Mean Salary £sa Mean Bonus (% of Salary)a 
   
Back Office 22,883* 8.2* 
Middle Office 39,922* 13.1* 
Front Office 62,012* 25.2* 
Total 37,773 13.8 
R Square .480 .442 
a These figures were calculated by anti-logging the values for ln (salary) and ln (bonus) that 
were used in the ANOVA 
* The mean difference between this figure and all others is significant at the 5% level. 
 
 
The hypothesis that the proximity to revenue generating activities is positively 
associated with base salaries is supported by the data in Table 3. Individuals 
working in the front office receive on average nearly three times the salary as 
those working in the back office. The value of the R square means that nearly 
half of the variation in salaries can be accounted for by an individual’s 
proximity to certain areas of activity in the organisation. 
 
The results in Table 3 also confirm that there is an association between the 
proximity of an occupation to revenue generation and the bonus level. The data 
show that whilst the difference between mean bonus levels in the middle and 
back office is statistically significant at the 5% level it is relatively small. This 
contrasts strongly with the mean bonus received by individuals in the front 
office, which is almost double of that for the middle office. The R square value 
of .442 indicates that almost 45% of the variation in bonus levels is accounted 
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for by differences in the office of activity. This figure is marginally lower than 
the corresponding figure for salary levels. This finding is also consistent with 
hypothesis 2, since the MRPL theory can apply equally to fixed and non-fixed 
pay. Thus, the importance of where an occupation is situated in relation to the 
process of revenue generation in determining wage levels has been established. 
 
 
The Effect of Job Grade on Pay 
 
Job grade within an organisation is likely to be positively associated with 
remuneration. This phenomenon is not restricted to the financial services sector 
and the factors behind it are well understood. Job grade may be taken as a proxy 
for a number of employee characteristics, each of which is positively associated 
with wages. Human capital theory (e.g. Becker 1964) states that as workers 
acquire both general and firm-specific human capital their productivity rises and 
this is reflected in increased wage levels. Job grade is also associated with extra 
responsibilities including that of management, thus, as the demands of the job 
increase, so too will the compensation. If promotional tournaments are utilised 
as a management tool then job grade may be associated with higher worker 
quality, which again should be reflected in higher wages. The relationship 
between job grade and pay can be formally stated by the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3 
Pay will be positively associated with job grade 
 
An ordinal variable measuring job grade was created using the occupational 
descriptions contained in the dataset. A five-point scale was used to avoid the 
possibility of arbitrariness. Table 4 summarises the measure. 
 
Table 4. The Classification of Job Grade 
 
Management Level Job Characteristics 
  
Head of Department A general management or in charge of department 
High staff responsibilities 
Manager A manager/assistant manager of an area of banking activity 
Has specialist staff working under them 
Senior Position A senior specialist 
May have staff working under them 
Standard Position An analyst or officer 
May guide junior staff 
Junior Position A junior position in the department 
No staff responsibilities 
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This classification of management grade will be used to statistically test the 
relationship between grade and pay. It is expected that the theoretical 
relationship outlined above will be more evident in base salaries than it is in 
bonus levels. This is partly due to the fact that at high levels of seniority the 
form that incentive pay takes is not confined to a cash bonus. As job grade 
increases within the organisation, the likelihood of being partially remunerated 
by share-based schemes rises (Jensen and Murphy 1990). Since the dataset 
concentrates on salaries and bonuses, therefore, the implication is that job grade 
will be most strongly associated with salary levels. 
 
 
Table 5. Mean Salary and Bonus by Job Grade 
 
Level of Seniority Mean Salary £sa Mean Bonus (% of Salary)a 
   
Junior Position 18,965† 7.9*** 
Standard Position 30,006† 11.1** 
Senior Position 41,411† 14.3* 
Manager 54,932† 18.5** 
Head of Dept 102,282† 36.7*** 
Total 37,773 13.8 
R Square .687 .392 
a These figures were calculated by anti-logging the values for ln (salary) and ln (bonus) that 
were used in the ANOVA 
† The mean difference between this figure and all others is significant at the 5% level.*** The 
mean difference between this figure and all others is significant at the 5% level. ** The mean 
difference between this figure and that for a ‘senior position’ is not significant at the 5% 
level. * The mean differences between this figure and those for a ‘senior position’ or 
‘manager’ are not significant at the 5% level. 
 
 
The data in Table 5 summarise the association between the level of job grade 
and salaries and bonus levels. An employee in a ‘junior’ position will receive on 
average just under £19,000 whilst a senior individual such as a head of 
department will be paid over £100,000 in basic salary. The differences in means 
between the five categories of job grade are all highly significant at the 5% level 
for salary levels. The high R square value of .687 is noteworthy in that it 
indicates that over two thirds of the variation in base salaries can be accounted 
for by the level of job grade as defined here. The implication that job grade is 
the single most important determinant of salary is coincident with the 
predictions of both theory and an understanding of the sector. 
 
The results for bonus levels are more ambiguous. Although the ANOVA is 
significant at the 5% level, post-hoc analysis of pair-wise differences show that 
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not all of the differences between the group means are significant at the 5% 
level. Specifically, the mean bonuses of junior staff and heads of department are 
significantly different from all other categories, whereas there is more 
ambiguity in the middle three ranks of the seniority scale. This contrasts with 
the analysis of job grade and salary levels where there was a clear and 
unambiguous difference between group means. The R square of .392 indicates 
that less than 40% of the variation in bonus levels can be explained by 
differences in seniority. Again, this contrasts strongly with the earlier analysis 
of the effect of job grade on salary levels where the value of R square was .687. 
Thus, the hypothesis that job grade is more strongly associated with salary 
levels than it is with bonuses is supported by the data. 
 
 
A Model of Bonus Determination 
 
The various theories of wage determination treat the fixed and non-fixed 
components of pay as analytically separate. From the preceding discussion of 
the hypotheses emerging from the literature on wage theory and the interviews 
it is clear that the determinants of base salary on the one hand, and bonuses on 
the other, are different. Therefore, an obvious first step in analysing the 
determinants of bonus pay is to examine the extent to which this is true. If the 
determinants of fixed and non-fixed pay are indeed different, there should be 
little correlation between salary and bonus levels. This hypothesis can be tested 
by running a simple bi-variate linear regression of the following form: 
 
Model 1 
ln (bonus) = α + β ln (salary) + ε 
 
It should be noted that bonuses are expressed as a percentage of base salary. 
The results of the regression are presented in Table 6. The first line of the table 
shows the value of β is significant at the 5% level indicating that there is a 
statistical association between base salary and bonus. The relatively high R 
square value of .663 indicates that two thirds of the variation in bonus levels can 
be accounted for by variations in base salary. 
 
This finding is seemingly at odds with the theoretical prediction that the two 
types of pay are influenced by different factors, and therefore, should not be 
related. One implication of the relatively high degree of association between 
salaries and bonuses is that bonus pay is not only used as a tool to overcome the 
principal-agent problem, but is also a means of augmenting the total 
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remuneration offered to employees in order to satisfy the demands of the labour 
market. 
 
 
Table 6. The Relationship Between Base Salary and Bonus 
 
Model Coefficient β R Square 
   
Whole Sample .964** .663 
Output Not Easily Measurable .786** .599 
Output Somewhat Measurable .966** .450 
Output Easily Measurable .716** .318 
** Significant at the 5% level. 
 
However, examining the salary-bonus relationship in the light of the predictions 
of principal-agent theory yields a different picture. A major prediction of the 
theory is encapsulated in hypothesis 1, namely that the bonuses will vary with 
the measurability of output. In the context of the salary-bonus relationship this 
leads to the prediction that the correlation between salaries and bonuses will be 
lower as the measurability of output increases. 
 
Table 6 includes results from linear regression analysis of the above model 
using different subsets of the data. The dataset was split according to the 
measurability of output of the occupations. The results are all significant at the 
5% level. The value of R square, which indicates the goodness-of-fit of the 
model, falls as the measurability of output rises. Whereas almost 60% of the 
variation in bonus levels is accounted for by variations in salary for occupations 
with low measurability, this figure almost halves for occupations with high 
measurability of output. The fact that the relationship between salaries and 
bonuses is weaker in those occupations where theory suggests PRP schemes 
will be more successful is important in that it indicates that bonus determination 
is a distinct process from that of salary setting. 
 
The preceding analysis has concentrated on three distinct determinants of bonus 
determination and has found all of them to be statistically significant. In order to 
extend the analysis of bonus setting, statistical models will be constructed to 
examine in more detail the factors at work. The appropriate tool of analysis is 
the univariate ANOVA technique that examines how a continuous dependent 
variable is affected by differences in a number of ordinal independent variables. 
The model depicting the determinants of bonus pay takes the following form: 
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Model 2 
ln (bonus) = f (job grade, economic value created, measurability of output) 
 
Table 7 presents the results of running an ANOVA test on the above model. 
Unlike linear regression modelling, analysis of variance does not allow for an 
estimation of an ‘equation’ with coefficients for the variables. The results 
indicate whether or not the independent variables are significantly associated 
with the dependent variable. 
 
 
Table 7. Univariate ANOVA Results for Model 2 
 
Factor F - Statistic Significancea 
   
Corrected Model 18.437 .000 
Intercept 2104.387 .000 
Job Grade 16.536 .000 
Economic Value Created 4.780 .009 
Measurability of Output 3.322 .037 
   
Seniority by Economic Value 1.128 .344 
Seniority by Measurability 2.835 .005 
Economic Value by Measurability .807 .491 
Seniority by Economic Value by Measurability .938 .442 
R Square .648  
a The significance level of the variable. A value below .05 indicates statistical significance at 
the 5% level. 
 
 
The results in Table 7 show that bonus levels are significantly associated with 
the three factors that have been discussed. All of the main or individual factors 
are significant at the 5% level. Table 7 also shows the significance of the 
interactions between the various factors. An interaction indicates that the effect 
of one factor varies according to the value of another. From Table 7 it can be 
seen that there is a statistically significant interaction between job grade and the 
measurability of output. This implies that the effect of measurability on bonus 
levels is not even across different levels of job grade. This can be illustrated 
graphically by looking at a plot of predicted marginal means in Figure 1. 
 
For there to be no interaction between the two factors, the three lines in Figure 1 
would have to be parallel and distinct. The fact that this is clearly not the case 
indicates that the effect of the measurability of output on bonus levels varies 
according to the job grade of the individual. Across the middle three tiers of job 
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grade the lines are broadly parallel indicating the effect of measurability is fairly 
constant. This is what would be expected if there were no interaction between 
the variables; for a given job grade the more measurable output is, the higher 
the bonus will be. For both junior, and especially very senior positions, 
however, the effect of measurability on output changes. In junior positions, it 
appears to make very little difference if output is extremely measurable or only 
somewhat measurable. In the case of department heads the effect of 
measurability of output on bonus levels seems to break down completely, 
implying that bonuses will not depend to any meaningful degree on the 
visibility of output. This last finding is consistent with the practice of senior 
management being remunerated according to company-wide measures of 
performance, such as share-based schemes. 
 
Figure 1. The Interaction Between Job Grade and
Measurability of Output on Bonus
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The result that for very senior positions, the relationship between output 
measurability and bonus level breaks down, is important. It is consistent with 
the ‘hold-up’ problem identified by Williamson (1985) and developed by 
Malcomson (1997). The theory suggests that where the employee embodies 
firm-specific capital it is in the interests of both parties to continue the 
employment relationship. In the context of heads of department in the financial 
services sector, the value of such firm specific information may be high. In 
these circumstances the employee may be able to hold-up the employer and 
extract higher remuneration (Malcomson 1997). Thus, the predicted relationship 
between the measurability of output and bonus levels will break down. This is 
analogous to changing the contract from one of incentive provision to one of 
risk sharing for the employee’s benefit (Stiglitz 1987). 
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It is, therefore, important to consider the effects of interactions between 
variables when interpreting the results of ANOVA tests like those presented in 
Table 7. The R square value of .648 for the model under investigation indicates 
that almost 65% of the variation in bonus levels is explained by the factors in 
model 2. 
 
Earlier analysis concluded that there is an association between salary and bonus 
levels. In order to construct a model that better fits the data, this can be 
incorporated into the analysis as a covariate. Since there was a high degree of 
association between job grade and salary levels, job grade will be excluded 
from the analysis to avoid the problem of autocorrelation between the 
independent variables. The model under investigation takes the following form: 
 
Model 3 
ln (bonus) = f (ln (salary), economic value created, measurability of output) 
 
Table 8 summarises the results of running a univariate ANOVA test on the 
above equation. The results show that the model is statistically significant at the 
5% level. In this case, however, there is no significant interaction between any 
factors. This implies that the variables under investigation influence bonus 
levels in a discrete manner and can be treated as analytically distinct. The 
individual factors, together with the salary covariate, are all significant at the 
5% level. 
 
 
Table 8. Univariate ANOVA Results for Model 3 
 
Factor F - Statistic Significancea 
   
Corrected Model 99.468 .000 
Intercept 110.361 .000 
Ln (salary) 253.556 .000 
Economic Value Created 3.511 .031 
Measurability of Output 6.093 .003 
   
Economic Value by Measurability 2.454 .063 
R Square .704  
a The significance level of the variable. A value below .05 indicates statistical significance at 
the 5% level. 
 
 
The R square value of .704 shows an improvement compared to model 3 and 
indicates that including salary information improves the goodness-of-fit of the 
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model. It is also important to note that the R square value here is better than for 
the regression of salary on bonus indicated in Table 6. The important 
implication of this is that bonus levels can be better explained by a model 
including factors such as measurability of output and economic value created 
than by simply looking at salary levels alone. This adds weight to the hypothesis 
that bonus pay is a distinct tool of remuneration. 
 
 
VI.  Conclusions 
 
This paper has examined the use of bonus pay in the financial services sector. 
The question that has been addressed is whether variations in payment systems 
can be explained by principal-agent theory. The principal-agent problem is said 
to exist when there is an information asymmetry between managers and 
workers. The theory suggests that in the absence of perfect monitoring, the 
provision of an incentive contract should encourage the agent to put forth 
sufficient effort. The contract choice facing a manager is one of providing 
income insurance, or risk sharing, on the one hand, and the provision of 
incentives on the other. The underlying prediction of the theory is that the use of 
bonus pay will be more prevalent where the cost of measuring worker output is 
lowest. 
 
The results of the statistical analysis of industry level wage data have confirmed 
the importance in the measurability of output in determining bonuses. However, 
the analysis also found that there were other variables associated with the use of 
bonuses, thereby confirming the findings of the case studies. Both marginal 
revenue product, as measured by ‘economic value,’ and the job grade of the 
individual within the organisation were found to be significantly related to 
bonus levels. There were also found to be significant interactions between some 
of these variables. 
 
Thus, the principal-agent framework does appear to explain the use of bonus 
pay, but only in part. It is undeniably true that the costs of measuring individual 
output are important in explaining the use of bonus pay. The existence of 
alternative determinants of bonus levels, such as marginal product and job grade 
does not in itself negate the validity of the principal-agent model. However, the 
results of the statistical analysis, combined with the insights gained from the 
case study interviews, suggest that principal-agent theory needs to be modified 
to take account of certain institutional characteristics of the financial services 
sector. In particular, the labour market power exercised by certain employees in 
the sector, is seen to frustrate the provision of incentives. 
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